20/12/24



Electricity Authority Te Mana Hiko Wellington New Zealand

Sent via email: connection.feedback@ea.govt.nz

To whom it may concern,

This letter outlines CentrePorts submission to the Electricity Authority for the following:

- A. Distribution Connection Pricing: Proposed Code Amendments
- B. Network Connections Project: Stage One Amendments

CentrePort would like to thank the Electricity Authority for engaging with organisations who are directly affected by the connection processes and pricing methodologies used by Electricity Distribution Businesses (EDBs). We endorse the process that the Electricity Authority is undertaking and wish to provide some additional insights that may serve in further refinement of the new connection charges project.

# About CentrePort

CentrePort provides essential infrastructure services to the heart of New Zealand. It works for the region as a key Wellington lifeline, providing safe, efficient, and low emission capacity within New Zealand's freight and supply chain. Our infrastructure supports New Zealand's North - South connection and is a gateway to the world.

CentrePort also has committed emissions reduction targets which are supported by a well-defined energy transition pathway. Current energy transition activities include:

- 1. Developing onsite/distributed electricity generation and electricity storage systems to improve energy system resilience and mitigate risks associated with:
  - a. Future electricity price path and market volatility.
  - b. Triggering upstream network capacity upgrades (noting that CentrePort has a constrained network supply.
- 2. Implementing an on-port electric vehicle programme for heavy duty container handling mobile plant.
- 3. Investigating on-road electric trucking services for key export customers.

### **CentrePorts Submission on Distribution Connection Pricing**

CentrePort generally supports the Electricity Authority's proposed Code amendment for Distribution Connection Pricing. Attached to this letter is CentrePorts completed response form.

CentrePort highlights the following key points:

1. CentrePort endorses the proposal to improve transparency of recovery of upstream costs where multiple consumers require significant capacity enhancements within the same sub transmission zone.

- 2. It is CentrePorts view that:
  - a. a criticality rating for each consumer type has merit, with the ability to then prioritise capacity on constrained networks to priority consumers.
  - b. the Code should ensure the benefit/value that embedded generation and storage brings to EDBs (in respect of alleviating network constraints and improving network resilience) should be compensated.
  - c. there should be a clear process to facilitate the valuation and transfer of ownership of assets that have already been established.
  - d. there needs to be further clarity on where and how the reform impacts the determination of WACC for EDBs.

# **CentrePorts Submission on Network Connections Project**

CentrePort generally supports the Electricity Authority's Network Connections Project and the proposed Code amendments.


Our general notes are that it is CentrePort's view that:

- 1. There needs to be a consistent approach across all EDBs for application, assessment and certification of proposed distributed generation and storage developments.
- 2. In addition to current performance measurements, EDBs should also be measured against asset utilisation as this helps to improve the value provided by existing assets rather than simply investing in more.
- 3. The Code needs to better recognise the long-term value that embedded storage offers, and therefore should (at least) have equal footing to embedded generation in any application, assessment and certification process.
- 4. EDBs imposed network capacity limits for a given connection should be verified either by EDBs being transparent in the underlying constraints that result in these limits, or by independent assessment.
- 5. New Zealand can benefit from all EDBs operating under a common data management standard, and for that standard to offer transparency to all connected parties.
- 6. Any penalty charges levied against customers for issues including power quality and/or capacity limit exceedance, are applied consistently across all EDBs, and are calculated so in a transparent manner such that the actual issue can be shown to be material to the EDB at that time.

### Closure

Again, CentrePort would like to thank the Electricity Authority for engaging with organisations who are directly affected by the connection processes and pricing methodologies used by EDBs.

Best regards



Andrew Steele

**GM Strategy and Stakeholder Relations** 

# Appendix A Format for submissions

Submitter	CentrePort Limited, Wellington
Outer	
Questions Q1. Do you agree with the assessment of the current situation and context for connection pricing? What if any other significant factors should the Authority be considering?	Comments   Yes.   CentrePort sees a need to consider various other general factors, including:   1. Whether the proposed amendment still provides too much freedom for EDBs given lack of true market competition.   2. Whether the proposed amendment does enough to create an environment that fosters trust and transparency in relationships between EDBs and consumers.
Q2. Do you agree with the problem statement for connection pricing?	Yes. CentrePort sees a need to consider the windfall benefit that embedded generation and storage brings to EDBs in respect of alleviating network constraints and improving network resilience. This recognition should be reflected in the connection pricing and/or ongoing fixed charges.
Q3. Do you have any comments on the Authority's proposed pathway to full reform?	CentrePort supports the identification of quick wins to get going early, get some progress, and gain momentum. CentrePort suggests that the Authority needs to consider the opportunity/need for another round of consultation as part of the Development stage in Full Reform.
Q4. Do you consider the proposed connection enhancement cost requirements would improve connection pricing efficiency and deliver a net benefit?	Yes.
Q5. Are there variations to the proposed connection enhancement cost requirements you consider would materially improve the proposed Code amendment?	It is CentrePort's view that there needs to be more recognition (including financial) of the benefit/value that embedded generation and storage brings to EDBs in respect of alleviating network constraints and improving network resilience. This recognition should be reflected in the connection pricing and/or ongoing fixed charges.
Q6. Do you consider the proposed network capacity costing requirements would improve connection pricing efficiency and deliver a net benefit?	Yes

Q7. Are there variations to the proposed network capacity costing requirements you consider would materially improve the proposed Code amendment?	Νο
Q8. Do you consider the pioneer scheme pricing methodology would improve connection pricing efficiency and deliver a net benefit?	Yes.
Q9. Are there variations to the proposed pioneer scheme pricing methodology you consider would materially improve the proposed Code amendment?	It is CentrePort's view that the Authority needs to consider the complexities in how the pioneer scheme is applied due to the variables and potential protracted timeframes between first mover and future movers.
Q10. Do you consider the cost reconciliation methodology would improve connection pricing efficiency and deliver a net benefit?	Yes.
Q11. Are there variations to the proposed cost reconciliation methodology you consider would materially improve the proposed Code amendment?	It is suggested that the Authority consider whether the proposed approach to asset life presents a windfall opportunity for asset owners and how that windfall could be utilised for wider benefits.
Q12. Do you consider the reliance limits would improve connection pricing efficiency and deliver a net benefit?	Yes
Q13. Are there any variations to the proposed reliance limits you consider would materially improve the proposed Code amendment?	It is suggested that the Authority consider whether there is an "opt out" of the reliance limit by mutual agreement.
Q14. Do you consider the exemption application process (together with guidelines) can be used to achieve the right balance between improving connection pricing efficiency and managing transitional impacts on non- exempt distributors?	Yes.
Q15. Do you consider the dispute resolution arrangements proposed (for both participants and non- participants) will provide the right incentives on distributors and connection applicants to resolve disputes about the application of pricing methodologies to connection charges and improve connection pricing efficiency and deliver a net benefit?	Yes

Q16. Are there variations to the	No
proposed dispute resolution	
arrangements you consider would	
materially improve the proposed	
Code amendment?	
Q17. Do you consider the	No
alternative contractual terms	
option would be better than the	
approach in the proposed drafting	
attached to this paper? Please give	
reasons.	
Q18. Do you think a sinking lid	CentrePort views the sinking lid approach as preferable
approach to reliance limits would	given the timeframe for the step change option being
be preferable to the proposed	too distant and the current market dynamics.
static limits approach described in	Connection applicants will have more confidence to
sections 7.80 – 7.105?	sanction projects if there are clear signals of change
	coupled with early evidence of actual change.
Q19. Do you think any element of	No
the fast-track package should be	
omitted, or should begin later	
than the rest of the package?	
Q20. Are there other parameters	No
you think the Authority should	
consider for the proposed	
connection pricing	
methodologies? If so, which ones	
and why?	
Q21. Do you agree pricing	Yes, but the option to pursue alternate terms by mutual
methodologies should apply to	agreement should remain for LCCs
LCC contracts? If not, please	
explain your rationale.	
Q22. Do you agree the proposed	Yes.
requirements, other than reliance	
limits, can be applied satisfactorily	
to connections with vested assets?	
If not, please explain your	
rationale.	
Q23. Do you have any comments	CentrePort suggests that there needs to be a clear
on the impact of reliance limits on	process that facilitates the valuation and transfer of
incentives to increase prevalence	ownership of assets that have already been established.
of asset vesting?	
Q24. Do you agree the proposed	Yes
methodologies are compatible	
with contestable connection	
works? If not, please explain your	
rationale.	
Q25. Do you agree that fast-track	Yes
methodologies should not apply to	105
embedded networks? If not,	
please explain your rationale.	As discussed earlier, it is superstable to the Authority
Q26. Do you have any comments	As discussed earlier, it is suggested that the Authority
on the Authority's anticipated solution for longer-term reform?	consider the opportunity/need for another round of

	consultation as part of the Development stage in Full Reform.
Q27. Are there other alternative	CentrePort suggests the Authority consider whether the
means of achieving the objective	reform impacts the determination of WACC for lines
you think the Authority should	companies, and if so what does this materially affect
consider?	how the amendment or reform is administered.